V5b AES-GCM

AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION

CRYPTO 101: Building Blocks

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Overview

NIST Special Publication 800-38D
November, 2007

Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
and GMAC

National Institute of
Standards and Technology

Morris Dworkin

- * AES-GCM is an authenticated encryption scheme designed by David McGrew and John Viega in 2004.
- * Adopted as a NIST standard (SP 800-38D) in 2007.
- Uses the CTR mode of encryption and GMAC, a custom-designed MAC scheme.



CTR: CounTeR mode of encryption

Let $k \in_R \{0,1\}^{128}$ be the secret key shared by Alice and Bob. Let $M = (M_1, M_2, ..., M_u)$ be a plaintext message, where each M_i is a 128-bit block and $u \le 2^{32} - 2$.

To encrypt *M*, Alice does the following:

- 1. Select a nonce $IV \in \{0,1\}^{96}$.
- 2. Let $J_0 = IV || 0^{31} || 1$.
- 3. For *i* from 1 to *u* do: $J_i \leftarrow J_{i-1} + 1 \text{ and compute}$ $C_i = \text{AES}_k(J_i) \oplus M_i.$
- 4. Send $(IV, C_1, C_2, ..., C_u)$ to Bob.

To decrypt, Bob does the following:


- 1. Let $J_0 = IV || 0^{31} || 1$.
- 2. For *i* from 1 to *u* do: $J_i \leftarrow J_{i-1} + 1$ and compute $M_i = AES_k(J_i) \oplus C_i$.

Notes on CTR mode

- 1. CTR mode of encryption can be viewed as a stream cipher.
- 2. As was the case with CBC encryption, identical plaintexts with different IVs result in different ciphertexts.
- 3. It is critical that the IV should not be repeated, but this can be difficult to achieve in practice.
- 4. Unlike CBC encryption, CTR encryption is parallelizable.
- 5. Note that AES⁻¹ is not used.
- 6. The secret key can have bitlength 128, 192 or 256.

Multiplying blocks

- + Let $a=a_0a_1a_2...a_{127}$ be a 128-bit block. We associate the binary polynomial $a(x)=a_0+a_1x+a_2x^2+\cdots+a_{127}x^{127}\in\mathbb{Z}_2[x]$ with a.
- + Let $f(x) = 1 + x + x^2 + x^7 + x^{128}$.



Évariste Galois

- * If a and b are 128-bit blocks, then define $c = a \cdot b$ to be the block corresponding to the polynomial $c(x) = a(x) \cdot b(x) \mod f(x)$.
 - * That is, c(x) is the remainder upon dividing $a(x) \cdot b(x)$ by f(x) in $\mathbb{Z}_2[x]$.
 - * This is multiplication in the Galois field $GF(2^{128})$.

Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC)

- * Let $A = (A_1, A_2, ..., A_v)$, where each A_i is a 128-bit block.
- * Let *L* be the bitlength of *A* (encoded as a 128-bit block).
- + Let $k \in_R \{0,1\}^{128}$ be the secret key.
- 1. Let $J_0 = IV || 0^{31} || 1$, where $IV \in \{0,1\}^{96}$ is a nonce.
- 2. Compute $H = AES_k(0^{128})$.
- 3. Let $f_A(x) = A_1 x^{\nu+1} + A_2 x^{\nu} + \dots + A_{\nu-1} x^3 + A_{\nu} x^2 + Lx \in GF(2^{128})[x]$.
- 4. Compute the authentication tag $t = AES_k(J_0) \oplus f_A(H)$.
- 5. Send (*IV*, *A*, *t*).

Computing $f_A(H)$ using Horner's rule

- * Example: Let $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$.
 - + Then $f_A(x) = A_1 x^4 + A_2 x^3 + A_3 x^2 + Lx$.
 - + Hence, $f_A(H) = A_1H^4 + A_2H^3 + A_3H^2 + LH$.
 - * $f_A(H)$ can be computed using Horner's rule: $f_A(H) = ((((((A_1 \cdot H) + A_2) \cdot H) + A_3) \cdot H) + L) \cdot H.$
 - * This requires three additions and four multiplications in $GF(2^{128})$.
- * In general, if *A* has blocklength *v*, then computing $f_A(H)$ using Horner's rule requires *v* additions and v + 1 multiplications in $GF(2^{128})$.

Security argument

- + Consider the simplified tag: $t' = f_A(H)$.
 - * An adversary can guess the tag t' of a message A with success probability $\frac{1}{2^{128}}$.
 - * She can also guess the tag t' by making a guess H' for H and computing $f_A(H')$. Her success probability is at most $\frac{v+1}{2^{128}}$, where v is the blocklength of A.
 - * However, if the adversary sees a single valid message-tag pair (A, t'), she can solve the polynomial equation $f_A(H) = t'$ for H.
- * To circumvent the aforementioned attack, a second secret $AES_k(J_0)$ is used to hide t': $t = AES_k(J_0) \oplus f_A(H)$. The secret $AES_k(J_0)$ serves as a one-time pad for t'.

Authenticated encryption: AES-GCM

Input:

- * AAD (Additional Authenticated Data), also called encryption context: Data to be authenticated (but not encrypted): $A = (A_1, A_2, ..., A_v)$.
- * Data to be encrypted and authenticated: $M = (M_1, M_2, ..., M_u)$, $u \le 2^{32} 2$.
- * Secret key: $k \in_R \{0,1\}^{128}$, shared between Alice and Bob

Output: (IV, A, C, t), where

- * *IV* is a 96-bit initialization vector.
- $+ A = (A_1, A_2, ..., A_v)$ is the additional authenticated data.
- + $C = (C_1, C_2, ..., C_u)$ is the encrypted/authenticated data.
- * *t* is a 128-bit authentication tag.

AES-GCM encryption/authentication

Alice does the following:

- 1. Let $L = L_A || L_M$, where L_A, L_M are the bitlengths of A, M expressed as 64-bit integers. (L is the length block.)
- 2. Select a nonce $IV \in \{0,1\}^{96}$ and let $J_0 = IV || 0^{31} || 1$.
- 3. Encryption: For i from 1 to u do: Compute $J_i = J_{i-1} + 1$ and $C_i = AES_k(J_i) \oplus M_i$.
- 4. Authentication: Compute $H = AES_k(0^{128})$. Compute $t = AES_k(J_0) \oplus f_{A,C}(H)$.
- 5. Output: (*IV*, *A*, *C*, *t*).

Note:
$$f_{A,C}(x) = A_1 x^{u+v+1} + A_2 x^{u+v} + \dots + A_{v-1} x^{u+3} + A_v x^{u+2} + C_1 x^{u+1} + C_2 x^u + \dots + C_{u-1} x^3 + C_u x^2 + Lx$$

AES-GCM decryption/authentication

Upon receiving (IV, A, C, t), Bob does the following:

- 1. Let $L = L_A || L_C$, where L_A, L_C are the bitlengths of A, C expressed as 64-bit integers.
- 2. Authentication: Compute $H = AES_k(0^{128})$. Compute $t' = AES_k(J_0) \oplus f_{A,C}(H)$. If t' = t then proceed to decryption; if $t' \neq t$ then reject.
- 3. Decryption: Let $J_0 = IV || 0^{31} || 1$. For i from 1 to u do: Compute $J_i = J_{i-1} + 1$ and $M_i = AES_k(J_i) \oplus C_i$.
- 4. Output: (A, M).

Some features of AES-GCM

- 1. Performs both authentication and encryption.
- 2. Supports authentication only (by using empty M).
- 3. Very fast implementations on Intel and AMD processors because of special AES-NI and PCLMUL instructions for the AES and operations.
- 4. Encryption and decryption can be parallelized.
- 5. AES-GCM can be used in streaming mode.
- 6. The secret key can have bitlength 128, 192 or 256.
- 7. Security is justified by a security proof:
 - * The original McGrew-Viega security proof (2004) was wrong.
 - * The proof was fixed in 2012 by Iwata-Ohashi-Minematsu.

Performance

Speed benchmarks[†] from 2018 on an Intel Xeon CPU (E3-1220 V2) at 3.10 GHz in 64-bit mode.

Relative speeds will likely be very different on other processors.

Source: www.bearssl.org/speed.html

Algorithm	block length	key length	digest length (bits)	speed (Mbytes/
ChaCha20		256		323
Triple-DES	64	168		21
AES-128	128	128		170
AES-128-NI	128	128		2426
AES-256	128	256		129
AES-256-NI	128	256		1830
GMAC	128	128	128	247
GMAC- PCLMUL	128	128	128	1741

IV's should not be repeated

IV's should not be repeated (with the same key k).

- * Suppose an IV is reused, and an eavesdropper captures two transmissions: (IV, A_1, C_1, t_1) , (IV, A_2, C_2, t_2) . Suppose also that M_1 and M_2 have the same blocklengths, and that the eavesdropper knows M_1 .
- * Then $t_1 = AES_k(J_0) \oplus f_{A_1,C_1}(H)$ and $t_2 = AES_k(J_0) \oplus f_{A_2,C_2}(H)$, so $t_1 \oplus t_2 = f_{A_1,C_1}(H) \oplus f_{A_2,C_2}(H)$.
- * This polynomial equation can be quickly solved for H, and then $AES_k(J_0) = t_1 \oplus f_{A_1,C_1}(H)$ can be computed.
- * Thereafter, the adversary can properly encrypt/authenticate any plaintext (of blocklength at most that of M_1).