# Course: Modern Cryptography Public Key Encryption Scheme, KEM, DEM


Shashank Singh

IISER Bhopal

October 30, 2025

## DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL

Let (G, .) be a cyclic group, where DLP is known to be computationally hard. Let  $G = \langle g \rangle$  and |G| = q.




If, it is feasible to do the key exchange. Why can't we send the whole message in the same fashion, alleviation the need of Private Key Cryptography?




Diffie and Hellman also introduced in their ground-breaking work the notion of public-key (or asymmetric) cryptography.

# SETTING OF PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY




# **ELGAMAL ENCRYPTION SCHEME**





## **ELGAMAL ENCRYPTION SCHEME**



## PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION SCHEME

It is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (GEN, ENC, DEC) such that:

- **Key-generation algorithm:**  $(pk, sk) \leftarrow GEN(n)$ , we refer pk as a public key and sk as a private key.
- **Encryption algorithm:**  $c \leftarrow \text{ENC}_{pk}(m)$  for a  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , the message space.
- **Decryption algorithm:** DEC() takes as input a private key sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs a message m or a special symbol  $\perp$  i.e.,  $m := \text{DEC}_{sk}(c)$ .

It is required that, except possibly with negligible probability over (pk, sk), we have  $DEC_{sk}(ENC_{pk}(m)) = m$  for any (legal) message m.

## SECURITY DEFINITIONS

Given a Public-key encryption scheme  $\Pi = (\texttt{GEN}, \texttt{ENC}, \texttt{DEC})$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , consider the following experiment:

# The eavesdropping indistinguishability exp $\operatorname{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n)$ :

- $-(pk,sk) \leftarrow \text{GEN}(n).$
- A is given pk, and it outputs a pair of equal-length messages  $m_0, m_1$  in the message space.
- The challenge ciphertext  $c \leftarrow \text{ENC}_{pk}(m_b)$ , where  $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$ , is given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a bit b'. The output of the experiment is 1 if b' = b, and 0 otherwise. If b' = b we say that  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds.

A public-key encryption scheme  $\Pi=(\texttt{GEN},\texttt{ENC},\texttt{DEC})$  has indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries  $\mathcal A$  there is a negligible function  $\varepsilon$  such that

$$\Pr\left[\operatorname{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\operatorname{eav}}(n)=1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(n)$$

Remark: Since A is given pk, A can access the encryption oracle for free.

A public-key encryption scheme  $\Pi=(\texttt{GEN},\texttt{ENC},\texttt{DEC})$  has indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries  $\mathcal A$  there is a negligible function  $\varepsilon$  such that

$$\Pr\left[\operatorname{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\operatorname{eav}}(n)=1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(n)$$

Remark: Since A is given pk, A can access the encryption oracle for free.

# Proposition

If a public-key encryption scheme has indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper, it is CPA-secure.

### **Theorem**

If public-key encryption scheme  $\Pi$  is CPA-secure, then it also has indistinguishable multiple encryptions.

### Remark

For public-key encryption schemes- indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper, CPA-security, and indistinguishable multiple encryptions- that are all equivalent. We will simply use the term "CPA-security" to refer to schemes meeting these notions of security.

## SECURITY AGAINST CHOSEN-CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS

# The CCA indistinguishability exp Pub $K_{A,\Pi}^{cca}(n)$ :

- (pk, sk) ← GEN(n).
- $\mathcal{A}$  is given pk and and access to a decryption oracle  $DEC_{sk}(\cdot)$ . It outputs a pair of equal-length messages  $m_0, m_1$  in the message space.
- The challenge ciphertext  $c \leftarrow \text{ENC}_{pk}(m_b)$ , where  $b \overset{\text{uni}}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}$ , is given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- A continues to interact with the decryption oracle, but is not allowed to request a decryption of c itself.
- $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a bit b' . The output of the experiment is 1 if b' = b, and 0 otherwise. If b' = b we say that  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds.

A public-key encryption scheme  $\Pi=(\texttt{GEN},\texttt{ENC},\texttt{DEC})$  has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-ciphertext attack (or is CCA-secure) if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries  $\mathcal A$  there is a negligible function  $\varepsilon$  such that

$$\Pr\left[\operatorname{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\operatorname{cca}}(n)=1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(n)$$


### Remark

If a scheme has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-ciphertext attack then it has indistinguishable multiple encryptions under a chosen-ciphertext attack, where this is defined appropriately.

# HYBRID ENCRYPTION AND THE KEM/DEM PARADIGM


- Public key encryption schemes are much slower than the private key encryption schemes.
- It is possible to do better by using private-key encryption in tandem with public-key encryption. The resulting combination is called hybrid encryption and is used extensively in practice.
- The basic idea is to use public-key encryption to obtain a shared key k, and then encrypt the message m using a private-key encryption scheme and key k.

# HYBRID ENCRYPTION..



where  ${\tt ENC}()$  is a public key encryption scheme and  ${\tt ENC'}()$  is a private key encryption scheme.

## HYBRID ENCRYPTION..



where ENC() is a public key encryption scheme and ENC'() is a private key encryption scheme.

► A more direct hybrid approach is to use a public-key primitive called a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) which will be described in the next slide.

# KEY-ENCAPSULATION MECHANISM (KEM)


## Definition (KEM)

It is a tuple of PPT algorithms (GEN, ENCAPS, DECAPS) such that:

- GEN() takes as input the security parameter  $1^n$  and outputs a public-/private-key pair (pk, sk).
- $-(c,k) \leftarrow \text{ENCAPS}_{pk}(n).$
- $\perp \text{ or } k := \text{DECAPS}_{sk}(c).$

It is required that with all but negligible probability over (sk, pk) output by  $GEN(1^n)$ , if  $ENCAPS_{pk}(1^n)$  outputs (c, k) then  $DECAPS_{sk}(c)$  outputs k.

- Any public-key encryption scheme trivially gives a KEM by choosing a random key k and encrypting it. As we will see, however, dedicated constructions of KEMs can be more efficient.
- Using a KEM , we can implement hybrid encryption as in Figure below.



# DATA-ENCAPSULATION MECHANISM (DEM)

 A private-key encryption scheme, where secret key is obtained using KEM, is called a data-encapsulation mechanism (DEM) for obvious reasons.

## A FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF DEM

Let  $\Pi = (\text{GEN}, \text{ENCAPS}, \text{DECAPS})$  be a KEM with key length n, and let  $\Pi' = (\text{GEN}', \text{ENC}', \text{DEC}')$  be a private-key encryption scheme. Construct a public-key encryption scheme  $\Pi^{\text{hy}} = (\text{GEN}^{\text{hy}}, \text{ENC}^{\text{hy}}, \text{DEC}^{\text{hy}})$  as follows:

- $GEN^{hy}$ :  $(pk, sk) \leftarrow GEN(n)$ .
- ENC<sup>hy</sup>: on input a public key  $\mathit{pk}$  and a message  $\mathit{m} \in \{0,1\}^*$ ,
  - Compute  $(c,k) \leftarrow \text{ENCAPS}_{pk}(n)$ .
  - Compute c' ← ENC $_k'(m)$ .
  - Output the ciphertext  $\langle c, c' \rangle$ .
- DEC<sup>hy</sup>: on input a private key sk and a ciphertext  $\langle c, c' \rangle$ ,
  - Compute  $k := DECAPS_{sk}(c)$ .
  - Output the message  $m := DEC'_k(m')$ .

A key-encapsulation mechanism  $\Pi$  is CPA-secure if for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal A$  there exists a negligible function  $\varepsilon$  such that

$$\Pr\left[\text{KEM}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{cpa}}(n) = 1\right] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(n)$$

## where,

# $KEM_{A,\Pi}^{cpa}(n)$ :

- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{GEN}(n)$  and  $(c, k) \leftarrow \text{ENCAPS}_{pk}(n)$
- A uniform bit  $b \in \{0,1\}$  is chosen. If b = 0 set  $\hat{k} := k$ . If b = 1 then choose a uniform  $\hat{k} \in \{0,1\}^n$ .
- Give  $(pk, c, \hat{k})$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , who outputs a bit b'. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b' = b, and 0 otherwise.

### **Theorem**

If  $\Pi$  is a CPA-secure KEM and  $\Pi'$  is a private-key encryption scheme that has indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper, then  $\Pi^{hy}$  is a CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme.

A key-encapsulation mechanism  $\Pi$  is CCA-secure if for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal A$  there exists a negligible function  $\varepsilon$  such that

$$\Pr\left[\text{KEM}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{cca}}(n) = 1\right] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(n)$$

where,

# $KEM_{A,\Pi}^{cca}(n)$ :

- $-(pk,sk) \leftarrow \text{GEN}(n) \text{ and } (c,k) \leftarrow \text{ENCAPS}_{pk}(n)$
- A uniform bit  $b \in \{0,1\}$  is chosen. If b = 0 set  $\hat{k} := k$ . If b = 1 then choose a uniform  $\hat{k} \in \{0,1\}^n$ .
- Give  $(pk, c, \hat{k})$  and access to oracle DECAPS<sub>sk</sub> $(\cdot)$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  is not allowed to request decapsulation of c.
- $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a bit b'. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b' = b, and 0 otherwise.

## CCA SECURITY OF DEM

If the private-key encryption scheme  $\Pi'$  is not CCA secure, then (regardless of the KEM used) neither is the resulting hybrid encryption scheme  $\Pi^{hy}$ .

### Theorem

If  $\Pi$  is a CCA-secure KEM and  $\Pi'$  is a CCA-secure private-key encryption scheme, then  $\Pi^{hy}$  is a CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme.